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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellee's attempt to reduced Appellant's brief to three catagories
issues to be ruled upon by the Appeals

Courts based

upon law

(StatutueS)

only
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Appellant's brief. This case is a question of FACT and law. That fact and
law is a mixture of State Statutes, Utah State Constitution, Federal
Statutes, and the Unites States Constitution.
Appellee relies upon Carter v. Utah Power and Light and

Von Hake v.

Thomas as the "standard of review" for addressing the law only.

The

application of these citings in this case is misplaced and erroneous. The
analysis of these cases are contained herein.

Appellant's standard of

review is (among others) U.C.A., 78-21-3, Court to decide questions of law.
"

All questions, of law, including the admissability of evidence, the

facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other
writings, and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided
by the court and all discussion of law addressed to it,
are m

Moreover, facts

controversy as well as vilation of Mr. Barker's constitutional

rights along with conflicting statutes ana mas

be addressed.

This is an appeal from a contempt of court and judgement of Appellant
being an absconding debtor to avoid child support payments.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Same as Appellant's Brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Barker was erroneously found to be an absconding debtor and
incarcerated*

After explaining to the court his legal duty to his current

(second) family and children Mr. Barker was informed by the court that the
first and primary obligation was to pay for the welfare debt of the first
(welfare) family and that the others were secondary and that his new family
did not constitute a material change of circumstances.
This action was brought about through the efforts of the State of
Utah, Department of Human Services utilizing primarily the statutes, or
sections thereof, of the "Utah Human Services Code", U.C.A., 62a-l-101 and
the "Unified Civil Liability for Support Act",

U.C.A., 78-45-1.

The second family is clearly being relegated to "second or third
class" citizens with the first "welfare" family having first call on the
financial resources of Mr. Barker. In Fact, once a pay order is initially
set for the "welfare" family the second or subsequent "nonwelfare" family
cannot request its rights for equal protection and support of their father;
i.e., the payments to the "welfare" family can never be adjusted downward
to meet the growing needs and requirements of the second family. Any
additional children will forever be relegated to a second rate subservient
position to the first "welfare" family.
Through these statutes Mr. Barker and his children have and are being
deprived of many rights and constitutional guarantees. These statutes must

1

^

^v.uuw «xxv> ^O^-LCIJ-^^ unuunoLiLULiuiidi ana tne rignrs or Mr. Barker and

all of his family restored.
Mr. Barker, in fact and law, understands very well the Utah State
child support enforcement laws and procedures. How these child support laws
(1)

conflict

with

and

contradict

other

Utah

State

Statutes

and

"administrative procedures"; (2) conflict with and attempt to contradict
the Utah State Constitution; (3) conflict with and contradict superior
federal

statutes

and

citings;

and

(4)

conflict

the

United

States

Constitution.
Appellee's argue that Mr. Barker's arguments are within 3 categories
and they attempt to limit the standard of review for two of the categories
to only questions of law.

That is not so.

All of the categories have

facts that are in controversy so the standard of review should include
questions of facts and the law as well as Constitutional rights violations.
The case, cited by Appellee,

Carter v. Utah Power and Light, 800 P.2d 1095

(Utah 1990) does not apply to the instant matter since there was no claim
to a constitutional

rights deprivation in that case.

The instant matter

does, in fact, claim a gross constitutional deprivation of rights in many
areas along with facts in controversy and instances of conflicts between
the Utah statutes and the Utah Constitution..
Appellant's court record a motion

For good cause shown in

and demand is hereby made for a review

of the facts and the law and there is no reason why a protective order
should be issued or said facts should be withheld from either the public
or the Appellate review courts.
The Utah Court of Appeals has, on the record, denied it's own Motion
for Summary Judgment and Appellee's arguments for the same have been
overcome by Appellant; thereby indicating that the facts as well as the law

2

will be reviewed.

Tnererore,

m e d^ciiuc ^ o ^ ^ ^ * ^ ,

arguments are merely three categories to be adjudicated on the standard of
law review alone is frivolous, in bad faith,

and moot.

"Summary Judgment

is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

TransAmerica Cash

Reserve, Inc., v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990).

Utah

Rules of Civil Proc, Rule 56 (c) .
Further sanctions, moreover, should ensue, since attorneys of record
by their signature on their brief have shown a disregard to the rights of
Mr. Barker while they continue to increase the cost of litigation, to
confuse the real issue, to hide the facts, to take up more court time
needlessly, and further cause Mr. Barker more time in defending which
results in loss of income, increased litigation cost, time away from his
children, his business, and increased stress causing a loss of health.
ARGUMENTS OF CASE
POINT 1
APPELLEE'S DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF MR. BARKER AND
ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO COLLECT MONEY WHEN APPELLANT IS UNABLE TO PAY
Mr. Barker does not participate in the Federal or State Social
Security program therefore no benefits are available to him.

Since Mr.

Barker does not, in fact, use a State or Federal social security number
(see Record page 71 line 2 through line 5. ) the state cannot force him
into a contract under State or Federal Title IV-A of the Social Security
Act or Aid to Families with Dependant Children "AFDC" since they have no
jurisdiction over his person.

Ms. McGillivray was receiving an "AFDC"

grant as the custodial parent of the children.
12 through line 19.

(see Record page 13 line

The lower court has indicated this is an appealable
3

The State of Utah has no jurisdiction over Mr. Barker's person with
reference to the divorce since the state constructively frauded Mr. Barker
when "They didn't tell him that a marriage

license would give them

jurisdiction over his children, as if he were a U.S. Constitution, 14th
Amendment citizen

"

(See Record page 81 line 9 through page 82 line 7).

The Sixth Judicial District Human Relations court does not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter or person of Mr. Barker since Judge
Tervort is a Juvenile Court Judge.

No specific questions relating to

support have been certified to the Human Relations Court. The children are
not neglected or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
under U.C.A., 78-3a-16.
The Appellee's argument that they can intervene on behalf of Laura
McGillivray to collect six hundred dollars per month for the support of 4
children is not sound. The original divorce decree in the findings of fact
and conclusions of law determined that the monthly amount of child support
for 5 children would be 100 dollars per child or a total of 500 dollars but
would automatically increase to 600 dollars per month when the oldest child
reach age 18.

See Record page 11 line 24 through page 12 line 8.

Mr.

Barker cannot be penalized by a provision of a divorce decree, for an
automatic increase support money when his children leave the custodial
parent's home,
of

nor is it enforceable, unless there is a material change

circumstances

pursuant

Administration Rule 6-404.

to

U.C.A.,

78-45-7

(1)

and

Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871.

district court required to adhere to the statutes or is

Judicial
Is the

it above the law?

The facts are clear from the history of this case that Mr. Barker was
unable to pay child support due to involuntary loss of employment on at

4

least three occasions, turtneimuit; m c ^ U L X U ^ , ~^W,.W~~

__

McGillivray for support was acted upon for 5 years and included payment "in
kind", ie., a house, car, food, clothing, etc.

Said payment "in kind" was

not allowed by the Office of Recovery services.
U.C.A., 62A-9-104 (2) (b) however, allows the State to provide in kind
assistance to Ms. McGillivray.

Even

today Mr. Barker

is denied the right

to provide "in kind" assistance, he therefore invokes his right to equal
protection under the law pursuant to U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment
which applies to the common law as well as statutory law.
If Appellee's can provide support

"in kind" then Appellant should be

equally protected in his right to do the same.

Appellee attorneys know

from the record, or should know, that Mr. Barker did not fail to provide
payment "in kind" and financial support for 5 years until he was unable to
do so due to involuntary circumstances. See Record page 100 line 8 through
line 16.
There was no notification by the Utah Department of Human Services
that the Barker children were on welfare.
through page 105 line 5.

See Record page 109 line 17

Pursuant to U.C.A., 63-la-l and more specifically

U.C.A. 63-la-2, which says:

"...Upon

default in payment of any account

receivable, the entity responsible for collecting the account shall send
a notice, by certified mail, to the debtor at the debtor's last known
address....", notification is required.

It is common knowledge that

notification is required but the lower court Judge would not allow Mr.
Barker to enter onto the record admission of fact that the Office of
Recovery Services did not notify him.

See Record page 15 line 25 through

page 16 line 18. The lower court abused it1 discretion and abused process.
Appellee's have not overcome by argument or evidence, on the record or off

5

Appellant was noticed by Appellee Ms. McGillivray's Affidavit

that

the children were, in fact, not on welfare from a time period prior to
1988.

See

McGillivray

Page 4, lines 15 through line 18. Affidavit of Laura (Barker)
in

Support

of Her

Objection

to

Defendant's

Motion

for

Restraining Order dated 19 October 1988.
POINT 2
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND DID NOT PROPERLY
REVIEW THE FACTS IN REFUSING TO MODIFY APPELLANT'S PETITION
Appellee's argue on page 12 of their brief, or make it appear by distortion
of the actual facts, that Mr. Barker voluntarily quit employment.

That is

not supported by the facts. Appellee's, on the same page, make it appear
that Mr. Barker has no basis for his constitutional rights violation claims
since he voluntarily accepted employment

with lesser pay when there was

no other employment available. The lower court arbitrarily

and with abuse

of process determined without any specific findings that Mr. Barker's
employment at the Hecla mine was
historical

earnings

when,

in

to be used as a standard for measuring
fact, the

specific

employment

was an

overemployment situation and which was pointed out to the Judge.

See

Record page 120 line 3 through line 19.
Appellee's, in their excessive zeal to collect money for the State
fail to exercise the common sense, inasmuch as they admit that the reason
Mr. Barker was unemployed was due to cutbacks or layoffs.

See Record page

116 line 5 through line 10. The facts are as pointed out on Record page
40, line 6 through line 11 and page 41 line 17 through line 21, that Mr.
Barker was involuntarily laid off, due to a corporate bankruptcy on one
occasion and on another occasion involuntarily lost his work contract due

6
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Barker to loose a business placing him in considerable debt.

See Record

page 49 line 15 through page 50 line 2.
Due to

a decline of economic conditions for mining and other work in

the area Mr. Barker was preparing to change occupations at the time. See
Record page 41 line 14 through line 16.
Appellee's argue that Mr. Barker's claim of medical injuries is
contradictory.

See Record page 116 line 5 through line 10. Mr. Barker has

a back problem which he testified hiding from his employers, and which is
aggravated by an old

injury

and therefore

chose, at the time, an

occupational change that allowed him to work around the injury, with the
assistance of his new wife and family.

See

Record page 46 line 18 through

page 47 line 21, Record page 50 line 21 through 25, Record page 58 line 8
through page 59 line 10, and Record page 103, line 1 through 17.

Also see

Exhibit- Chiropractors statement as mentioned on Record page 56 line 12
through page 57 line 19. There is no contradiction.
Since the State of Utah has, in the past paid all expenses for Ms.
McGillivray to go to college for her occupational change; it is certainly
reasonable that Mr. Barker can change his occupation when necessity
requires, ie., no other work of a like nature was available in the area at
the time.

Mr. Barker certainly has Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section

_1 right to life, which includes the right to work along with other rights
stated in his Brief. Also a U.S. Constitutional, 1st Amendment right and
a U.S. Constitution, 14th
law is guaranteed.

Amendment right to equal protection under the

The facts are Mr. Barker bore the expense of his

occupational change out of his own pocket while the taxpayers paid for Ms.
McGillivray' s.

Mr. Barker had

at the time, and has now, a Utah
7

w^uuu.uuuxvaax xxynu «_^ uutdiu t^up xuynieni:, wnen mere is no intent to
intentionally avoid child support.

The historical facts show that for 5

years Mr. Barker supported his family until he was unable to do so, in part
due to legal actions of appellee's, ie., incarceration resulting in
of a business.

Mr. Barker did not intend to

a loss

avoid child support, nor is

there any evidence or specific detailed findings on the record in arriving
at that conclusion.

See Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law dated

16 July 1993, item number 14 in Findings and

item number 7 in Conclusions,

which simply say "Defendant is intentionally underemployed."

See also

item 16 which says " Defendant is underemployed of the purpose of avoiding
his child support payments."

His career change was simply, at the time,

not making the money the state demanded.

See Also Findings of Facts and

Conclusions of Law dated 19 August 1993 and mailed 30 August 1993 item
number 5 which says " The court finds that, in the trial on June 30, 1993,
the Defendant, Mr. Michael Robert Barker, failed to support his minor
children as per the order of this court and was, therefore, held in
contempt of court and sentenced to 30 days in the Sanpete County Jail."
Contempt is "criminal" in nature as explained in Point 6 below.
Why did the state of Utah impute income to Mr. Barker when he was
making his career change in violation of the U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (d) iii,
since there is has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Barker's alleged

intentional underemployment was for the purpose of

avoiding child support?

The lower court did not follow said statute and

has abused it's discretion, and with abuse of process
Barker statutory and constitutional rights protection.

has denied Mr.
Considering that

Mr. Barker had a new growing family responsibility of a
children to support

wife and 5

it is not reasonable to suppose that he would work
8

for his own demise.
Mr. Barker had begun his farming career change prior to this action
before the court and even prior to a prior court action in Judge Tibb's
court in 1991. There are no arguments that rebut the facts that Mr. Barker
was involuntarily unemployed through no fault of his own, or that Mr.
Barker sought employment at the only other mine in the area but was unable
to

obtain

employment,

overemployment situation.

or

that

his

last

mining

contract

was

an

The facts do no even point to the possibility

that Mr. Barker was intentionally voluntarily unemployed.

See Affidavit

of Mr. Barker dated 9 July 1993, item number 5. Will Mr. Barker be denied
his statutory and constitutional rights to change his career when no other
work of a like nature was in the area? Appellee's argue that several other
mining operations were and are available in the area.

See Record page 118

line 7 through line 10 and Record page 119 line 5 through line 6.

That is

false. At the time there was only one gold mine which had merely initiated
a limited start up operation.

As was stated in Mr. Barker's Affidavit of

Mr. Barker dated 9 July 1993, item number 5, at the post Judgment trial,
there were 1500 applications for one job.

Declining economic conditions

at the time prevented Mr. Barker from obtaining employment and rather than
go on the welfare dole Mr. Barker made a career change in an attempt to
establish a well paying business in the St. George area..

In this

particular occupational change one does not simply quit one day for higher
paying employment. Farming to be successful requires a commitment to the
long term not the 9am to 5pm that Appellee's enjoy at taxpayers expense.
Utah Constitution, Article 12, Section 18, which was law at the time, says:
"Every person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever
possible, and a person or corporation, or their agent, servant, or employee
thereof, maliciously interfering or hindering in any way, with any person
9

wuuxuxii^ cuipj-vyuicuL ui jLium enjuyj-iiy employment aireaay ootained trom
any other corporation or person, shall be deemed guilty of a crime. The
Legislature shall provide by law for the enforcement of this section."
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Appellee's have interfered with Appellant's enjoying employment since
as a direct result of contempt incarceration Appellant's wife who was
unable to properly handle all the activities of the operation during that
time has divorced, leaving Appellant without transportation, with two
children of

tender age, making it impossible to conduct the operation in

the same way.
Appellee's Argument that Mr. Barker's financial situation had improved is
simply not factual in light of the above. Appellee's go back five years,
before Mr. Barker's change of circumstances, in disregard of his present
career change, to determine his earning capacity. Appellee's cite Hill v.
Hill, 869 P.2d (Utah App. 1994) in evaluating income.

The trial court in

"Hill" however, took into account husband's last three years of employment
and his current employment.

In the instant matter the last three years and

Mr. Barker's current employment are for the time period during which he was
continuously engaged in his farming career change. Moreover, unlike "Hill
who voluntarily quit a job, Mr. Barker was involuntarily terminated due to
shutdowns due to corporate failure.

"Hill" further accepted imputation of

income as proper: Mr. Barker did not.

In Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871,

873 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the court makes a determination of a financial
situation of the obligor at the time. Appellee's argue however, that Mr.
Barker's earning capacity should be based on a period 6 years earlier, at
the time of his divorce, along with a recent past mining employment which
was an overemployment situation.
118 line 6.

See Record page 117 line 2 through page

Mr. Barker had been farming for about 3 1/2 years prior to

this instant matter, but Appellee attorney attempts to go back 6 years
10

beyond Mr. Barker's present si
more money when his circumstances were different.
Appellee's attorney, Graf indicated on the record that a material
change of circumstances for income had, in fact, taken place.

See Record

page 117 line 5 through 12 and page 118 line 3 through line 6.
The lower court should not have imputed income to Mr. Barker and it has
abused it's discretion.

As stated elsewhere, income cannot be imputed

when there is a career change.

Furthermore, additional factors that go

beyond the critical question of whether the drop in earnings was voluntary
must be addressed.

It will be found that during times of local or national

business recession or depression people have, if

they

were fortunate,

accepted work of a lesser pay. The issue is not simply whether or not said
voluntary acceptance of work of lesser pay was by choice, but whether or
not other work of a like nature was available.

Mr. Barker prudently

accepted work of a lower pay due to the unavailability of mining work at
the time. At the time Mr. Barker was heavily in debt, in part caused by
action of Appellee's having put him in jail.

In the decision to do so he

contemplated the providing for his new family while at the same time
planing for the long term of doing the same for all his children by
developing a business.

Absolutely no evidence exists on the record that

Mr. Barker had intent to avoid child support payments. See Record page 100
line 5 through 16.

The finding of the lower court is clearly erroneous.

The facts are that a material change of circumstances did take place.
Mr. Barker had remarried and was supporting a wife and 5 children

prior

to the beginning of the most recent 1991 and 1993 Orders to Appear and Show
cause. See Record page 94 line 16 through page 95 line 15. The lower court

11

^wwv^**^*-^^

v_**^ po.iuiaj.)' ujjixyauiuu

circumstances for a new wife and
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suppuii

ior

me

cnange

ot

two natural children on the record but

then ruled to the contrary thereby abusing it's process.

See Record page

97 line 3 through 5. Specific findings are not sufficiently detailed which
justify the lower court arriving at it's conclusion.

See Finding of Facts

and Conclusions of Law dated 16 July 1993, item number 13 in Findings and
item number 6 in Conclusions which simply say there has been no significant
or material change of circumstances since the divorce. The findings of the
lower court are clearly erroneous and with abuse of discretion. Appellee's
attorney Graf indicated on the record that the

law on the books required

Mr. Barker to provide primary support for his stepchildren.

See Record

page 95 line 7 through 21.
Mr. Barker had also been farming for some time prior to the 1991 and
most recent 1993 action.
3.

The lower court

See Record page 39 line 7 through page 40 line

erred when it did not allow for the change of

circumstances for Mr. Barker's new family including the stepchildren.
Said change of circumstances were first plead in Judge Tibb's court in
1991.

See Record page 21 line 8 through line 18.

The change in

circumstances should be allowed from the date it was first plead.

See

Record page 105 line 1 through page 106 line 4.
Appellee's are trying to force Mr. Barker into violating the equal
protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment when they try
to invoke U.C.A., 78-45-7.7 (5)

which in essence requires

that Mr.

Barker's children of his former marriage be supported with a greater money
amount than his is able to provide for his children of a subsequent
marriage;

since the

statute will

circumstances to decrease

not

allow Mr. Barker's

change of

a child support award so that he can support his

12

children equally. The statures, n
the U.S. Constitution,

Ln«y axx^w ouv^n « w*****v,, —

.

14th Amendment. Mr. Barker cannot be compelled to

unequally support his children and violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution as well as other constitutional safeguards as stated in
Appellant's Brief.
POINT 3
THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT YET ACTED UPON A RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Appellee's ignore the fact that pursuant to Ut. R. or Civil Proc,
Rule 60 (b) (6) Appellant filed a second Motion for Relief of Judgment and
Order which was mailed to the court from jail on 24 July 1993 which was not
acted upon.

In paragraph 4 Mr Barker clarifies that his net income from

self employment was difference by much less than the erronious gross income
appellee's allege. Appellee's attorney argued that Appellant's gross from
his farming operation be calculated

on not what U.C.A., 78-45-7.5

(4) (a)

requires, namely gross income from a business shall be calculated by
subtracting

necessary expenses from gross receipts. The court never

considered said motion or subsequent argument by both parties.
POINT 4
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FOR CONTEMPT IS DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD OF A
PRIOR COURT ORDER WHEREIN THE CONTEMPT WAS PURGED
The previous judgment entered on 29 April 1991 required Mr. Barker to
provide an accounting of his farming operation for six months.

The six

month accounting was provided to Judge Tibb's court which accounting was
about six months within the time period from March 1991 to January 1993.
It is obvious that the time periods overlap by

six months during which

time period Mr. Barker was purged of his contempt.

Mr. Barker was found

in contempt during the same time period for which he had purged the earlier
13
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Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972).

If the lower court in 1991 allowed a purging of the contempt charge
which reflected a career change and

an obvious change of circumstances and

found no intent to avoid child support payments is it not, under the
doctrine of res judicata, eligible for estoppel when the state of Utah
brings

up another contempt charge again two years later for the same thing

involving only a different time but overlapping period?
POINT 5
APPELLEE'S NEW ACTION THROUGH THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT GIVES THEM NO
JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT
Appellee's go to great length to ascertain that the instant matter is
separate, since it is now the Department of Human Services bringing action,
from all other actions.

The Department of Human Services has paid funds

authorized under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act.

Mr. Barker does

not participate in the Social Security scheme which has not been properly
ratified by the 50 states comprising the United States of America and
therefore, is not under the said jurisdiction.

See Record page 71, line

2 through line 19.
The other issues of fact which Appellee's try to dismiss have to do
with no jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Barker due to no contractual
nexus existing as explained in Appellant's Brief.

Also,

the matter is

res judicata since no action was taken by the lower court for about two
years since the 1991

action wherein the contempt charge was allowed to be

purged.
The fact

is that Ms. McGillivray broke her original contract for

support with Mr. Barker, ie., sold

a nearly paid for home which the court

14
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thereby becoming voluntarily more welfare dependant, along with other
written contract provisions from the beginning of the couples original
Mexican divorce, and then entered into another contract with
State Department of Human Services.

the Utah

Mr. Barker has not entered the

jurisdiction of the Department of Human Services by contract under U.C.C.,
70A-1-207 or other applicable law and explicitly reserves all his rights.

The Utah State of Utah constructively frauded Mr. Barker when it did
not inform him that his children could be taken away from him and given to
another person having mere custody and therefore has no jurisdiction over
his person.
POINT 6
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SAME RIGHT TO COUNSEL PROVIDED BY THE
DISTRICT COURT IN A PRIOR ACTION FOR THE SAME ALLEGED OFFENSE
First, Mr. Barker was not able to afford counsel nor was it appointed,
and

he was further denied counsel in his first appeal

by right pursuant

to U.C.A., 77-32-1 and U.C.A. 77-32-2 since his contempt was alleged to be
"civil" in nature.

Appellee McGillivray however, was provided counsel for

to litigate not only what the Utah Department of Human Services claimed was
owed to that agency but also to litigate what she claimed was owed from a
prior court order.

Mr. Barker's United States Constitution, 14th

Amendment right to equal protection under the law, in addition to Utah
Constitution, Article 1, Section 24 rights have been violated.
The lower court held repeatedly stated on the record that Appellee
attorney Graf was only trying to collect the money that the taxpayers had
paid through the Utah Department of Human Services to Ms. McGillivray.
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^LLuxney urai repeatedly argued

that he and the Office of Recovery Services were trying to collect a prior
court order of 600 hundred dollars per month.
through page 15 line 4.
Cause.

See Record page 13 line 8

Also see the original Order to Appear and Show

Mr. Barker was prevented by the lower court judge from finding out

how much money the Utah State Department of Human Services actually paid
Ms. McGillivray.

See Record page 19 through page 20 line 16 and Record

page 64 line 20 through

page 65 line 10.

The Utah State Department of

Human Services, as seen from the above, is lumping the prior $600 Dollar
child support award into its original order and is even including the $600
dollar amount into its internal accounting practices and attempting to
obtain the entire amount irrespective of what that agency actually paid
out; and further; they give no accounting as to what they actually paid
out.

In short that agency and attorney Graf are trying to collect for Ms.

McGillivray a prior court ordered amount pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-9 (1)
(a) and
represent

(b)

which say the attorney general or the county attorney

the Office of Recovery Services to

"... on behalf of the

obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support against the obligor."
U.C.A., 78-45-9 (a) is not legal and should be repealed.

Mr. Barker

is poor, and cannot afford an attorney, in part due to actions of
Appellee's as shown on the record earlier,
protection under the law

but he is denied equal

pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment

since he does not have the same right

to counsel as Appellee Ms.

McGillivray.
In McWhirter v. Donaldson et al, 104 P. 731 says:
"Under Comp. Laws 1907, Subsection 133, providing that no practicing
attorney shall became (sic) surety in a suit in which he is engaged as
attorney, attorneys at law cannot act in the dual capacity of surety and
16

attorney in the same action.
The Utah State Department of Human Services has attempted to act as a
surety for Mr. Barker notwithstanding that the contract for support that
Ms. McGillivray entered into with that agency is a different contract than
she entered into with Mr. Barker for child support.

Surety is defined, in

part, in Black's Law Dictionary as "Everyone who incurs a liability in
person or estate, for the benefit of another, without sharing in the
consideration, stands in the position of a "surety," whatever may be the
form of his obligation.

Howell v. War Finance Corporation, C C A . Ariz.,

71 F.2d 237, 243."
Notwithstanding that Mr. Barker maintains the fact that he has not
entered into any contract with the Human Service agency and that he as a
principal " has no right to control the conduct of the agent with respect
to matters entrusted to the agent.

This right of control is the primary

or essential test of an agency relationship without which no agency exists
and the same standard applies when the agency relationship is implied. "
Nidiffer v. Clinchfield R. Co. (1980, Tenn App) 600 SW2d 242 10 Air 4th
1260.

"The principal-agent relationship results from the manifestation of

consent by one person to another that the other shall act on the first
person's behalf and subject to his control, and the other must consent so
to act: whether the relationship exists is a question of fact and the party
alleging the existence of the agency has the burden of proof."

White v.

Boucher (1982, Minn) 322 NW2d 560, 34 Air 4th 179. This lack of contract
is more fully explained in Appellant's Brief and relates to

the Uniform

Commercial Code and other applicable law.
Mr. Barker hereby motions the court for his rights Sua Sponte since the
lower court actively sought to deny him his rights instead of holding them
17

Second, the court did not make specific findings of fact which meets
the general rule of proving contempt.

There is no clear and convincing

evidence of intent to avoid child support in this civil matter which led
to Appellants1 contempt incarceration. Also Mr. Barker has been unable to
obtain that portion of the record which is on the 10:00am

tape number DR-

7 6 and after 1360 on the tape, which relates to Judge Tervort making the
comment "well that takes care of that." , thereby indicating that the
contempt charge was purged. As is evidenced on the record the lower court
and the Appellate Court did not follow the rules of appellate procedure so
that the transcript, which was repeatedly requested, was not

available to

Mr. Barker pursuant to those rules. This portion was repeatedly requested
verbally and by letters to Mr. Lidell, the court reporter.
The Appellee's attorney argued but did not present any evidence or
witnesses

testifying

that Mr. Barker

could

confront

as to

alleged

intentional underemployment for the purpose of avoiding child support. Nor
did the lower court allow the right to assistance of counsel.

Therefore

Mr. Barker's due process rights were not provided by the lower court.

U.

S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, U.C.A.,78-32-3, as cited in Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
In the prior same 1991 civil matter before Judge Tibb's District
Court, counsel was provided to Mr. Barker because there was the threat of
"body execution" or incarceration. The contempt order that Mr. Barker
purged was civil in nature since there was a conditional provision whereby
relief was obtained from the accounting given to the court by him.
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).

Von

Nevertheless, Judge Tibb's did

properly appoint an attorney named Mr. Berry as counsel to Mr. Barker. See
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should be obvious since at the beginning of adjudication by the court it
could not determine, prior to its findings, whether or not the contempt
would be classified "criminal" or "civil" in nature.

Judge Tervort on the

other hand gambled that Mr. Barker would not be held in "criminal" contempt
in this civil matter, but lost, since the determinants for the supposed
"criminal" contempt were present resulting in a denial of Mr. Barker's
substantive right to counsel.
The primary determinant of whether an order for contempt is labeled
civil or criminal is the trial court's purpose in entering the order.

"A

contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the court's
authority, as by punishing an individual for disobeying an order, even if
the order arises from civil proceedings."

Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P.2d

1162 (Utah 1988) .
The 1993 instant matter, relating to contempt, is "criminal"

in

nature since the purpose of incarceration was to punish Mr. Barker for not
having paid child support and it is fixed and unconditional.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
of Law dated

Von Hake v.

See Findings of Facts and Conclusions

16 July 1993 the Conclusion 11 and 12 which say:

"11.

Defendant should be held in contempt of court for failure to make the child
support payments as ordered for the period from March 1, 1991, through
January 31, 1993.

12.

Defendant should serve 30 days in the Sanpete

County jail as penalty for his judgment of contempt, said 30 days to begin
immediately...."

Judge Tervort has erred with abuse of discretion and

abuse of process in denying Mr. Barker his right to counsel.

See Record

page 127 line 3 through line 5.
Looking at Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 as cited in Von Hake v.
19
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elements justifying a civil non-support contempt order were not met in
reference to Mr. Barker.

Namely :

knew what was required, (2)
that he willfully and
In reference

(1) The person cited for contempt

that he had the ability to comply; and (3)

intentionally failed to do so.
to (1) above, Mr. Barker knew there was a support

obligation from a prior court order he was unable to pay , but he did not
know, since he had not been noticed by the Utah Department of Human
Services, that the state of Utah had paid "AFDC" money to Appellee
McGillivray and that they were trying to collect it.
In reference to (2) above, the career change that Mr. Barker entered
into prior to the instant matter by its very nature
that cannot be terminated in a short time.

is not a career change

In otherwords, once an egg

producer has his operation on a constant basis as Mr. Barker has done he
cannot simply quit and loose several years effort in attempting to make in
a profitable concern.

Mr. Barker could not comply with the court order

once he became committed, locked in, as it were, to the long term operation
which was subsequent to his involuntary loss of work, as cited to the
record above,

and subsequent to his aggravated health condition.

A new

business usually does not show a profit for several years after it is
established.

See

Record page 102 line 21 through 25, and Record

4 9 line

5 through page 50 line 2.
Mr. Barker's new career change, as is usual with new endeavors, was
not making

a profit

at the time and he was unable to make payments.

Record page 33, line 10 through page 34 line 4.

See

The court knew that he

was involved in a career change and was unable to pay and there is no
indication anywhere on the record that said career change was intentional

20

for the purpose of avoiding cnnu auy^j-u ^UJU^...^,

__

belief unsupported by any facts, without any investigation on the part of
appellee's attorney.
In reference to (3) above, Mr. Barker did not refuse to pay. Mr.
Barker did try to stipulate in Judge Tibb's court in 1991 that he would pay
a small amount as he was able to but attorneys for the State refused. Mr.
Barker also asked for more time to pay in 1993.

See Record page 110 line

16 through 22, and Record page 112 line 3 through line 4.
Moreover, in the 1991 court's order Mr. Barker was allowed to purge
the contempt order for the same alleged offense with no findings of
intentional child support avoidance.

Two years later the Utah State

Department of Human Services brought up the same matter only for a
different time period.

The matter is res judicata.

There is no "clear and convincing" evidence on the record which is
necessary in proving

civil

contempt

nor are there any elements evidenced

on the record which show "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Barker is
underemployed for the purpose of avoiding child support.

Von Hake v.

Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).
There certainly are no

specific written findings of fact and

conclusions of law for each substantive element in proving (1) knowing what
was required, (2) having the ability to comply, (3) intentional failure or
refusal to do so, (especially intent).
discretion.

The court has erred and abused it's

Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d

1162

(unable to pay but

incarcerated him any way and would not provide him with counsel.)
Based on the fact that there are:
affect Mr. Barker's

(1) facts in controversy which

constitutional rights and, statutes which conflict

with each other as well as with the Utah and United States Constitutions,
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do

not

satisfy

appealable.

substantive

requirements

the

order

of

contempt

is

Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988).

Mr. Barker has suffered great nonrepairable harm as a result of his
incarceration.

His wife left him in part because of having to do all the

work of the farming operation as well as the fear of having to do it again.
Mr. Barker was left with no transportation with which to deliver his eggs
or haul feed for his flock.

He was left with two children of tender years,

a one year old baby in diapers and a three year old to tend by himself.
During the time of his incarceration the farming business deteriorated
that

in

chickens were mismanaged and a significant egg production loss

resulted due to his being absent.

The mental and physical strain has

resulted in a need to depend on neighbors in time of physical incapacity,
and a subsequent reduction of laying hens has been necessary in order to
physically do the work.

For this Mr. Barker is asking an additional

100,000 thousand dollars in pecuniary and punitive damages.

Appellee's

attorney arguments are frivilous, and in bad faith.
The lower court denied Mr. Barker's right to stay his jail sentence
due to its "strong feelings". See Record page 125 line 9 through page 125
line 14. The court has with abuse of discretion abused it process.
POINT 7
APPELLANT ALLEGES VIOLATION OF RULE 11 AND FALSIFICATION OF RECORD
Mr. Barker raised the issue of falsification of the record at the very
beginning of the proceedings.

See Record page 109 line 3 through line 16.

Sanctions under Utah Rules of Civil Proc, Rule 11 and award for
iamages should be imposed against Appellees since Appellant has been harmed
and deprived of his constitutional rights to equal protection under the
22
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Appellant's Brief and Addendum to Brief other matters relating to sanctions
are argued

above.

As pertaining to Rule 11 in reference to Appellee Ms. McGillivray
having an attorney to litigate her alleged arrears of child support by a
prior divorce decree and monies allegedly owed the Department of Human
Services:

"This rule emphasizes an attorney's public duty as an officer

of the court, as opposed to the attorney's private duty to represent a
client's interest zealously.

Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146 (1991).

Affidavit of Appellant dated 17 September 1994.

See

Mr. Barker did not have

the same right to counsel and without cost as Ms. McGillivray.
Attorneys for the Appellee's have with full knowledge, information and
intent attempted to deprive Mr. Barker of his Utah and U.S. Constitutional
rights as well as depriving him of his statutory rights and privileges.
Evidence of the same, in addition to the arguments above, is found in the
Conclusion to Appellee's Brief wherein they state:

"The lower court also

properly specifically outlined its findings of fact and conclusions of law
based upon the record and the law." The obvious missing elements that were
not properly and specifically ruled upon were the facts.

The facts.

The lower court did not properly address the facts on the record and
has abused its discretion and has also abused its' process.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Mr. Barker Prays for the following relief:
1.

That Mr. Barker's arguments should not be summarily rejected since Mr.

Barker has continually demanded all of his rights which have been violated.
The Appellate Court should adjudicate on the facts in controversy as well
as issues of law and issues at law.

23

Auuu

*MJL

. i-»Q±.jvci- uv dwdiuea reiier or a judgment

which has allowed a

vindictive or avaricious ex-wife, who refuses to work or cooperate, to
place a burdensome accumulating debt for the purpose of harassing him so
that he cannot engage in a career change or live a respectable existence.
Careful review of the facts will prove that this case is, in the words of
Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Crockett, "subject to exceptions under
particular circumstances,"

Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 578, 133

P.2d 528, 530.
3.

For sanctions against Appellee's attorneys attempt to hide the facts

which appear in the Record Transcript since it has resulted in harm to
Appellant, ie., alienation of affection from his wife at the time, loss of
health, income, etc.
4.

To find that the Utah Department of Human Services has no jurisdiction

over the person of Mr. Barker.
5.

To award

sanctions or pecuniary and punitive damages because

Appellee's attorneys have litigated in violation of the law since they are
attempting to act as a surety for a party to the action.
6.

Reverse findings of fact and conclusions of law to show that Mr.

Barker is not intentionally underemployed for the purpose of avoiding child
support.
7.

That there is in fact a material change of circumstances which

included a wife, natural children and stepchildren.
8.

That there is a material change of circumstances based on a reduction

of income of Mr. Barker.
9.

To hold Utah Department of Human Services guilty of maliciously

interfering with employment that Mr. Barker had already obtained.
10.

Find that the lower court has abused it's discretion and abused it's
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process as alleged above.
11. Award Mr. Barker an additional 100 thousand dollars for sanctions and
pecuniary and punitive damages based on the above.
12.

To provide any other relief as the court deems proper.

Dated 19 September 1994

Signed

VERIFICATION
I, Michael R. Barker, do affirm, and say and verify that the foregoing is
true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information
and
and
LllUllUClLXUil
CtilU. belief
J J C 1 X C 1 CILIK
is not for the purpose of delay and it is done in good faith.~
/^

Dated 19 September 1994

S:

Dated ig^sgfeptember 1994

Witnes

Dated 19 September 1994

Witness

CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I, MICHAEL R. BARKER, certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Response to Appellee's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, or hand
delivered to the following:
Attorney General
C/OPaul Graff #1229
Asst. Atty. Gen'l
201 East 500 North
Richfield, Utah 84701

Laura B. McGillivray
202. W. 300 N.
Manti, Utah ff-ffc*2

Court Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
on y£ September 1994.

Signed
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